A strange checklist is needed for coping with in-flight emptiness and fires along the lines hinted at.

A strange checklist is needed for coping with in-flight emptiness and fires along the lines hinted at, nevertheless not endorsed, in Boeing's MD-11 supplemental bulletin of last June Readers will recall that this bulletin, intended to clarify matters regarding in-flight fire emergencies onward MD-11 aircraft, was criticized for possibly adding to the confusion (see ASW, June 28) Now results the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), urging Boeing [BA] in a family 10 letter to "develop a fresh checklist which contains as a first stair the suggested 'alternative' action of unpowering non-essential electrical and air conditioning systems"

"We be warmed that we are competent to advance a technical opinion onward your position," the ALPA alphabetic character signed by Executive Air Safety Chairman Paul McCarthy, declared. The circulating checklist, which can take 30 minutes to do with no guarantee of isolating the source of an electrical fire, "provides no assistance in a time-critical fire situation," the ALPA literal meaning declared. Crews need better guidance than a Hobson's Choice, ALPA argued. "If nothingness is not normal, then the first pace of any procedure should be LAND AS by and by AS POSSIBLE (emphasis in original). This is the last statement in succession the current Boeing checklist," the alphabetic character said. >> ALPA, tel. 703/688-2270 <<

The 'Hobson Choice' currented To The Crew

Three of ALPA's affairs about the latest guidance upon coping with MD-11 in-flight electrical fires

* The current checklist procedure currently allows for repowering of the electrical combination of parts to form a wholes as the smoke switch is mov from united position to the next. Industry prompts have demonstrated that a rigidly damaged circuit can cause a catastrophic end to occur if the electrical circuit is re-powered. This management isolating one electrical source at a time and allowing re-powering of a possible faulty circuit, proposes the aircraft and crew in a 'Hobson Choice' situation: the gang does not perform the checklist, or the gang performs the checklist as forthwith published wherein they stand a upright chance of fueling a catastrophic event

* Additional troubleshooting, as it is as pulling circuit breakers - if the affected circuit can be identified, may be necessary. If the ship's company cannot identify the origin of the fire/smoke, then in what way can they identify which C/B to pull? Not all of the C/B's are located in the cockpit, which can further complicate the problem

* The existing configuration of the MD-11 cockpit does not allow either pilot to reach the fire extinguisher with his/her oxygen mask in succession This makes it difficult to decide who will fight the fire, who will direct the fire fighting duties, and who might have to proceed off oxygen in order to fight the fire. If undivided can get to the fire extinguisher, what are the Boeing guidelines for getting the extinguisher directed to the source of the fire if it is in the cockpit overhead area? ( Note: this is the area where fire damage was discovered forward the Swissair MD-11 that crashed race 2, 1998). Source: ALPA

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