"The report contains a wealth of things not to do.

"The report contains a wealth of things not to do."

-- John Goglia, Member, U National Transportation Safety Board

A minute's warning could have made the difference between life and death for 228 of the 254 persons aboard Korean Air Lines Flight 801 who were killed when the airplane smashed into Nimitz Hill just about 3 miles short of runway 6L at Guam International Airport.

In the 28 month since, investigators have get to to regard the August 6 1997 crash as a "classic" controll fight into terrain (CFIT) accident. "It's another example of in what manner several things going wrong in concord can lead to an accident," said John Hammerschmidt, a member of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) In its final, or "sunshine" hearing last week capping the massive investigation into the KAL 801 crash, the Board issued a sweeping indictment of deficiencies in training, equipment, air traffic repress and emergency response. These "several things" combined to lead to further another grim declaration, "The airplane was ravageed by impact and post crash fire."

As an example, the airport's minimum safe altitude warning combination of parts to form a whole (MSAW) had been "inhibited" for the sum of two units years prior to the accident as a ploy to minimize false warnings. The MSAW will alert soil controllers if an airplane is too grave In a sense, it is the ground-based equivalent of the airborne real property proximity warning systems (GPWS) installed in all the big commercial jets

onward the evening of the accident, the MSAW was active solitary in a one mile wide ring between 54-55 miles not at home from the airport. Had it not been inhibited inside the 54 mile ring, an alert controller could have provided the KAL 801 ship's company about 60 seconds' warning before impact, according to Richard Wentworth, single in kind of the many NTSB skilfuls who testified at last week's hearing.

And newer, "enhanced" GPW technology, with its "look ahead" function, had it been available upon the accident airplane, would have provided about a minute's warning (at the time of the Guam accident, the AlliedSignal Corps. [ALD] EGPW Mk 7 with an analogue input signal interface raise on the 737-300 was just going into production and was not available at the time for installation in the Korean 737-300) As it was, the first alert haleed from the airplane's GPWS when it was 1000 feet above the mould and just 26 seconds from impact. With the ne for earlier warning brought revealed by this crash, Board members signifyed their concern about the stately five-year program the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has allowed for the retrofit of EGPW into all big jet "Five years is too prolonged This (CFIT) is how persons are being killed and we should be pushing," declared NTSB Vice Chairman Robert Francis.

As a ensue one of the 16 recommendations emanating from this accident calls for an accelerated, 2-year retrofit program to install GPW in all turbine-powered aircraft carrying six or more passengers.

Many "holes" render free of accessed the way to catastrophe

The accident had its beginnings in extent before the crew's lastminute confusion. KAL pilots bearinged their approach training exclusively at Kimpo airport, according to the NTSB's Paul Misencik. And that training was forward runways where the DME (distance measuring equipment) was at the runway, unlike the approach at Guam, where a DME transmitter located between the final approach fix (FAF) and the runway would instant a pilot with distance values that would decrease, then increase again. As a deduction a crew flying into Guam 6L would papal court the same values twice.

In the repetitious training at Kimpo, Misencik explained, with DME transmitters at the airport, a "near naught DME was always part of the approach training."

"Sound like training for the test" sniffed NTSB Chairman Jim Hall.

To be enduring the crew of the accident flight viewed a videotape of the approach to Guam before departure, however, that videotape showed the approach in clear weather. It did not emphasize the complexity of the instrument approach or the potential hazard pos from high ground in the vicinity of the airport.

Nor did KAL have a formal CFIT awareness training program in place before the accident. In addition, First Officer Song-Kyo Ho had not complet mob resource management (CRM) training before the accident flight.

And, no question, fatigue played a major factor in the accident, according to Malcolm Brenner the NTSB's resident human performance master-hand On the cockpit voice recorder, Capt. Park-Yong Chul was overheard to confes "Eh really sleepy" The flight was being complet at 1:00 a.m. in the crew's household time zone, and it was the captain's first night flight in a week. "The captain was impaired from his fatigue. There's no doubt this was a central factor in the accident," Brenner declared.

upon a flight to Guam single in kind month before, Capt. Chul had cautioned his first officer that Nimitz Hill was a "black hole" requiring extra caution forward the approach. Yet, on the night of the crash, Capt. Chul's pre-approach briefing was more perfunctory, un-characteristic of his usual thoroughness. He advised that the ILS glideslope was abroad of action, and that a visual approach would be made. He did not brief his ship's company about the procedures that would be followed should a back-up instrument approach be necessary.