Near collisions during airport operations remain single of the most intractable point in disputes of air safety.

Near collisions during airport operations remain single of the most intractable point in disputes of air safety. Jim Hall, chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, possibility of goods to convene a summit onward the problem early this year in concord with Jane Garvey, head of the Federal Aviation Administration.

A novel case now under investigation illustrates at least single in kind truth: a Safety Board recommendation clos with the notation "Acceptable Action" does not necessarily signify that the hazard has gone away.

The case at hand occurr Dec 6 forward a classic "dark and confused night" at Providence, RI, when the gang of a United Airlines [UAL] B757 missed on the runway, was barely missed at a Federal Express [FDX] cargo jet taking opposite Hearing the roar of the FedEx jet upon the radio traffic between the tower controller and the United ship's company the crew of a US Airways [U] Metrojet B737 refused the controller's takeoff clearance.

The tower controller by the agency of the way, was unable to behold the US Airways jet 4000 feet away, and the airport was not equipped with a turf surveillance radar. The controller was providing takeoff clearance to an airplane he could not behold A similar case, in which disaster was narrowly averted, occurr at Minneapolis in 1985 and it took a certain quantity of eight years for one of the Board's recommendations to be complet That recommendation addressed the question at issue of harried controllers forgetting where all the airplanes are positioned. further in the 1985 and the 1999 incidents, controller were clearing traffic they could not papal court visually or by electronic means. That raises perhaps a deeper question about priorities: given the long-standing acceptance of this conduct is the system trying to be safe first, or instigate traffic as a first priority? The question may provide a useful starting point for discussions at the forthcoming summit upon runway incursions.

It is noted that the Safety Board recommendations going back 27 years were the conclusion of a fatal ground collision between a North Central Airlines DC-9 and a Delta Air Lines [DAL] Convair 880 at O'Hare International Airport (ORD) in succession December 20, 1972. The controller had issued ambiguous instructions to the Delta airplane during conditions of restricted visibility.

ASW's contributing editor, Rudolf Kapustin, who happened to be the Investigator-in-Charge of the 1972 O'Hare accident stated, "Stopping the practice of controller issuing clearances and instructions to airplanes they can't descry would be a relatively simple stair toward eliminating at least part of the hazard." However, he added, "Such a grade probably would inhibit traffic arise and capacity."

An Earlier Near Collision

* March 1985: A DC-10 cleared for takeoff by way of the local controller in poor visibility at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, roared down the same runway another DC-10 was cleared to taxi across. The DC-10 forward takeoff rotated and lifted opposite below takeoff speed and cleared the taxiing DC-10 by dint of a scant 50-75 ft., narrowly averting the collision of couple widebodies with 501 persons aboard. The Safety Board issues safety recommendation A-86-32 calling in succession the FAA form a task form into groups to analyze controller dependence forward memory.

* July 1987: FAA forms task force.

* Aug. 1988: FAA promises to publish a "Controller's Memory Manual," a self-help guide to improve memory.

* June 1989: FAA advises it has prefered a contractor to develop the handbook.

* August 1989: Draft fac-simile of the handbook circulated for review and comment

* June 1991: Final handbook published.

* April 1994: FAA advises that memory enhancement program incorporated into FAA Academy training courses.

* June 1994: Safety Board classified safety recommendation A-86-32 "Clos Acceptable Action."

Source: FAA

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