Editor's Note: The following items.

Editor's Note: The following items, picked from the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) modern hearings in Little Rock forward the crash of American Airlines [AMR] Flight 1420 are considered too important to be allowed to drift into the mental hard wake.

* Description of a hazard. A microburst is "a falling row of air that splashes and diverges," according to Dr Wesley Wilson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Wilson helped exhibit the Federal Aviation Administration's reasonable Level Windshear Alert System (LLWAS). single such microburst, with an estimated velocity of a certain quantity of 78 knots, hit Little Rock's Adams field shortly after the Flight 1420 crash. one passengers joked that they had gotten disclosed of the crashed airplane single to die in the rain and lightning. The field, on the way, was equipped with LLWAS II. A recently made known system, LLWAS III, with more sensors, will fill lairs in existing coverage. In fact, the of recent origin system may increase the number of microburst alerts near 50 percent, Wilson estimated.

* Wall of rejection. "We've had another accident where the bins came loose" groused Safety Board Chairman Jim Hall (see ASW, Feb 14) Of the five recommendations the Board issued in 1992 for improved cabin safety, the circulating status is the same onward all five:

Recommendation A-92-11: Require that overhead stowage bins installed in MD-80 series airplanes be modified to make secure that the bins remain secur to their anchorages, the bin doors remain clos and that passenger service units attached to the bins remain attached during accidents. existing status: Closed, Unacceptable Action.

Recommendation A-92-12: Review the design of overhead stowage bins that are installed in airplanes other than the MD-80 and order any corrective action that may be required, as cited in A-92-11. rife status: Closed, Unacceptable Action.

Recommendation A-92-13: Establish and require dynamic testing standards for overhead stowage bins and all component part fixtures. Current status: Closed, Unacceptable Action

Recommendation A-92-14: Require that transport category airplanes manufactured after a certain date be equipped with overhead stowage bins and element fixtures that meet the requirements of dynamic exhibition standards. Current status: Closed, Unacceptable Action.

Recommendation A-92-15: exhibit a timetable that will require modification of all bins and component part fixtures currently in service forward transport category airplanes in order to confront new dynamic test standards. general status: Closed, Unacceptable Action.

While the Federal Aviation Administration's overall acceptance rate of NTSB recommendations is onward the order of 80 percent or above, in this area of cabin safety the record is naught percent.

* Reduc safety area. Flight 1420 landed in succession Little Rock's runway 4R, the far extreme point of which does not have the requisite 1000 bottom safety area. Rather, the airport defence was just 450 feet beyond the period of the runway. Here's why: Runway 4R-22L was built for noise abatement final causes Only a given amount of land could be used. That was united factor determining its 7,200 base length (the nearby runway 4L-22R is 8200 feet long) The recently made known runway could not be positioned further to the southwest because of rising terrain. It could not enlarge further to the northeast because of the nearby river and its associated floodplain. The designers anticipated that chiefly of the landings would be made forward 22L (taking airplanes over the river just before touchdown), and in the greatest degree of the takeoffs would be made onward 4R (in which airplanes would be climbing through the river just after liftoff). Since overshoot be found twice as often as undershoot it was meditation better to have the longer spread over at the southwest end, which features a 1000 lower extremity safety area.

Thus did history conspire with conclusions on the fateful evening of Flight 1420 The last-minute decision to land onward 4R, the failure to arm spoilers, the delayed braking application, the shortened outrun area, the runway approach lights located onward steel poles in the freshet plain, were all factors contributing to the death of the captain and ten passengers, and destruction of the airplane. A senior Safety Board official proffered this terse observation: "Save a hardly any decibels and kill a not many people."

* Not alone. Little Rock's runway 4R-22L is not the sole one with an inadequate safety area. Regarding U runways in general, according to the NTSB:

58 percent adapted standard (i.e., 1,000 foot safety area).

25 percent do not qualified standard, but could be improved to proper standard. The FAA has estimated the price of this effort at $1 billion.

17 percent cannot feasibly be improved to come together standard. The approach to Little Rock's runway 22L falls in this category.

* A young mother's plea. The Safety Board used the hearings as an opportunity to make its point about the ne for child safety seats. Stephanie Manus of Benton, Arkansas testified. She was forward the accident flight, travelling with daughters Lauren, 4 and Emily, 18 month Mother was in a middle seat upon row 24, with Emily strapped into her car seat, which had been buckl into the window seat. Lauren was in an aisle seat. The mother described the final impact as "extremely violent." Although mother and daughters were injured, they all survived. Mr Manus attributed baby Emily's survival to the car seat, which she uses religiously for each flight. Due to the impact force, "I knew I could not have held Emily forward my lap," Mrs. Manus recalled. "Our children are more precious than laptop computer - which they advise us to state away - and something's got to be done about this," she tearfully declared.