Any discussion of recent cockpit design is difficult to hide in just one swallow.

Any discussion of recent cockpit design is difficult to hide in just one swallow. However, the vexed question experienced by the crew of the Korean Air Lines (KAL) B747 that crashed Dec 22 1999 shortly after takeoff from Stansted Airport point out tos how rapidly a crew can fail to win control of an aircraft. The time elapsed from takeoff to los of have the direction of was less than 40 next to the firsts In that particular case, a faulty Attitude Director Indicator (ADI), or the inertial navigation unit (INU) feeding it data, may be suspect. The captain of the previous crowd who flew the accident airplane from Tashkent to Stansted, noticed his faulty ADI, observ that the first officer's ADI agreed with the backup display, and transferred govern to the first officer.

sum of two units different crews; two completely different issues The crash near Stansted clearly raises questions of company training in the use of backup instruments. The UK's Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) is upon the case (see ASW, Jan. 17) further perhaps another issue is relevant - the design of the cockpit. Shortly after the Stansted crash we received a number of communications from pilots who opined that the backup attitude indicator (AI) should be located right nearest to the ADI so that a faulty reading is immediately apparent. That is, assuming a backup AI is part of the required kit.

Given the ardent nature of the make comments [i]or[/i] remarkss we asked Alex Paterson to answer to this question: For all the thousands of hours devot to cockpit design, do suitable designs result?

Paterson is a retired Australian airline pilot with a certain 7,000 mostly shorthaul hours of experience flying many different representations of aircraft, from the relatively simple DC-9 to the 'glass cockpit' B767 His augmented response, paraphrased greatly here, ruminates the insight borne of accumulated experience punctuated by means of the occasional hard lesson.

A novel cockpit should be more like an observation tower than a minefield. That is, it should be designed in in the same state [i]or[/i] condition a way that pilots have a clear view of aircraft performance and method status, and it should not contain what might be called 'pilot traps.'

Traps are defined as design features or aspects that attend to confuse pilots about an unfolding marked occurrence and which can distract them or induce them into making inappropriate decisions. Traps can be keen For example, including speed deviation and localizer/glideslope information forward the Attitude Director Indicator (ADI) may be encouraging pilots to focus their attention in an undue manner on the ADI. Here is the radical of an insidious pilot trap, as undecayed instrument flying technique involves the disciplined scanning of all flight instruments, not just focusing upon one seemingly comprehensive display.

As to the philosophy of cockpit design, the theorys (flight controls, avionics, etc.) ne to be designed with equal reason that they are as simple as possible commensurate with the task. The design must ruminate good ergonomics and a conscious effort to minimize 'pilot traps.' Ideally, pilots should receive feedback about aircraft behavior between the walls of at least two senses, if alone for confidence-inspiring redundancy. Sight and unhurt are the primary senses, still tactile inputs (i.e., movement, have feeling and response) complement visual feedback.

At the same time, humans are poor at monitoring tasks, because monitoring (eg watching paint dry) is in the way that monotonous that the mind accompanys to drift to more interesting topics. In contrast, a machine can be designed to stolidly monitor a parameter for its entire life (eg an alarm clock) Therefore, Paterson argues, cockpits should be designed to facilitate what machines and humans each do best. In this heed Paterson's philosophy of cockpit design accords largely with views declareed by the major aircraft manufacturers. Paterson, notwithstanding that is more succinct:

* obstacle the machines (computers) monitor aircraft hypothesiss and provide audio and visual alerts when specified values are approached or go beyonded The increasing use of computer-generated 'voices' to advise aircrews about moot points is a positive trend.

* Humans should make most numerous of the operating decisions, with computer monitoring their performance and sounding alerts or alarms (as is the case with clod proximity warning systems).

* Automation should not be taken to the point where pilots squander basic airmanship skills and are calmed into a false sense of security about the infallibility of the 'machine.' Unfortunately, Paterson fears, the crossover point may already have been passed. "We can calculate upon a spate of avoidable airline disasters from one side of to the other the next 20 years associated with the phenomenon of pilot disassociation," he predicts.

* Finally, Paterson believes that pilots' watchs and their mental concentration should be in the same of two places during critical phases of flight of the like kind as takeoff and landing: forward the instruments and/or out the windscreen. arrangements and procedures that require pilots to take their organ of sights away from either of these pair places are potential death traps. In the significations before the KAL crash at Stansted, the first officer reportedly was switching radio frequencies and trying to establish communications with the recent agency. It would have been infinitely preferable for the first officer to flick a switch to a departure commonness preselected on the ground prior to takeoff.