We note three latter cases where carriers felt compell to undertake independent audits of their safety programs and practices after experiencing a crash: Case 1: At the Little defence hearings into the June 1 1999 crash of American Flight 1420 Vice Chairman Robert Baker announced.

We note three latter cases where carriers felt compell to undertake independent audits of their safety programs and practices after experiencing a crash:

Case 1: At the Little defence hearings into the June 1 1999 crash of American Flight 1420 Vice Chairman Robert Baker announced, "We are moving toward les internal auditing and more third party auditing for the drift of creating an on-going proces of objective assessment of our performance against our have rules and our own standards and those that are awaited of us."

Case 2: Shortly after the fatal Jan. 10 crash of undivided of its Saab 340B twin-turboprops at Zurich, Swiss regional carrier Crossair announced that it was bringing in three [i]connoisseur[/i]s to conduct an independent safety evaluation (see ASW, Jan. 24)

Case 3: Alaska Airlines [ALK] lately announced that it had retained sum of two units safety experts with nearly 100 years of combined industry experience "to lead a comprehensive safety audit of all aspects of the airline's operations," according to a company announcement. The action personates one of the aftershocks of the fatal Jan. 31 crash of Alaska Flight 261 In addition, the carrier announced that "another ten independent adroits will be brought in to provide specific expertise in each of the operating areas - flight operations, and maintenance and engineering - as well as in security and hazardous materials handling."

united obvious question comes to mind: If independent audits are seen as a valuable form of checks and balances, and a further guard against internal complacency, would not the practice help base out abiding hazards before an accident?

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