"The tort connected view is about accountability.

"The tort connected view is about accountability.... Exposing factual data to the light of day offers a microscope on an industry."

-Michel Baumeister, Aviation plaintiffs lawyer

If each crash site and incident becomes a potential crime exhibition with individuals involved all the way up to top management liable to criminal prosecution, the import on needed improvements to air safety could be chilling.

however in an increasing number of high-profile cases, one affecting the nation's largest air carriers, safety and security shortcomings are leading to criminal prosecutions. As part of the painful proceedings, operators are being ordered to provide reams of documents, placing their internal practices subordinate to the proverbial spotlight. The consequence s are twofold. Painfully, in many cases convictions accrue More positively, but costly nonetheless, court-ordered corrective action orders are being issued, requiring companies to adopt and implement specified safety programs.

The vision of heavy fines, punitive damages and perhaps jail time, to paraphrase the focusing tenor of a hanging, concentrates the mind wonderfully Companies are responding by way of stamping more of their documents "confidential" and "proprietary."

At a symposium legioned by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) last week upon transportation safety and the law, the arguments could be crudely divided into sum of two units main avenues of thought.

The criminalization conundrum

united avenue, perhaps best summarized on Craig Philip, president and CEO of the Ingram Barge Co was simply that, "We fear the effort to criminalize each accident will compromise our efforts to improve safety." While he describes the maritime segment of the nation's transportation industry, Philip's one-liner neatly captures the apprehension of the airline industry - all that information captured through the "black box" could become a Pandora's chest a prolific source of potential troubles

The other line, exhibited by Tom Scott, U.S. attorney for the Southern District of Florida, was that "the NTSB should take first crack at these cases," on the contrary criminal prosecution should follow in those situations involving willful misconduct and the violation of federal statutes.

"It is my vivid belief that the NTSB, the Department of the Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies can work together to provide a continuum of airline safety improvement," Scott declared. He cited the cases involving the 1996 crash of a ValuJet DC-9 and the 1997 crash of a Fine Air DC-8 "The NTSB did its work at jobs and then the criminal prosecutions went forward."

The overarching belief in the airline industry is that safety hangs on information, but fear of prosecution could inject this Catch-22: the pour of information will dry up if populace within the system fear that its disclosure could disclose them to criminal proceedings. That anxiety prolongs from employees to top management.

besides those airlines that have place in place aggressive programs to analyze information recorded in flight, and to exploit voluntary employee safety reporting hypothesiss have achieved better safety records than those carriers without in the same state [i]or[/i] condition programs. Chris Hart, the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) assistant administrator for order safety, pointed out that carriers who systematically analyze information recorded in flight, known generically as Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs, "have an accident rate that's about six times lower" than those who don't have as it is programs.

More information: more safety

Three major carriers have decided in favor of collecting more rather than les information.

Capt. Roger Whitefield, head of safety for British Airways, a carrier that has pioneered FOQA programs now emulated according to at least 10 U.S. carriers, described the safety challenge as a syllogism:

Knowledge is power.

You can't deposit right what you don't know is wrong

The more you know, the better able you are to validate the powers of change.

Therefore, data is recorded for each flight, not only to establish the norm, moreover also to pick out "exceedances." In addition, confidential safety reports from pilots and cabin staff are systematically single outed The steady increase in similar reports reflects a confidence that the information will be used to improve safety rather than for fault-finding.

Whitefield asked the eviscerate question: "Would avoiding collecting data for fear of civil litigation be criminally negligent?" He answered his have a title to question with this line of reasoning:

* "We've decided that the way to mitigate the risk of litigation is to have an audit trail. The court may take the course that you're negligent without a proactive safety program."

* "We must demonstrate a what one is bound [i]or[/i] under obligation to do of care with a safety scheme that is second to none, and we believe to not do in this way would be criminally negligent."

* "Above and beyond the law, we believe we have a moral obligation to advance safety, and if we risk litigation, to such a degree be it."

That sentiment about the moral obligation to do the best possible was secondaryed by Capt. Carmen "Corkey" Romeo manager of flight safety at US Airways [U] "We ne to do it (improve safety) the best way we know, and that means we ne data." As far as potential litigation, he's fatalistic: "You're at no time doing enough fast enough whenever you're getting into litigation. Rather, we're prioritizing our efforts."